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Introduction
Since the adoption of the Single European Act, European Community
priorities have shifted from the task of harmonisation to the definition and
implementation of minimum requirements in the area of working con-
ditions. The encouragement of high labour standards, through legislation,
as part of a competitive Europe is a central objective of the priorities in
the social field of European Union policy. At the centre of the argument is
the belief that the labour market is just as much a social institution as an
economic one (Solow, 1990) and that ideas of fairness, motivation and
morale imbue the labour market. However, without regulation such prin-
ciples rarely emerge, and the result is a set of labour standards erroneously
designed to serve the economic imperatives of growth. All forms of regula-
tion, therefore, must be resisted in order to pursue greater levels of eco-
nomic prosperity. Companies can more profitably respond to signals from
the market place if they can reduce their core workforce and ‘hire and fire’
contract and/or part-time workers with the minimum of contractual com-
plication. Such is the thinking of the economics of the new right which
came to dominate much of the rationale behind labour market policy in
the US and the UK.
A counter-argument, however, would suggest that attention to the
social aspects of the employment contract would also provide important
contributions to economic growth by delivering higher productivity and
high-quality jobs. The elimination of discriminatory wage practices and a
reassessment of the attitude towards traditionally low-paid groups would
also contribute to the stated objectives of achieving economic and social
cohesion within the EU. Such developments, driven through necessity by a
legislative framework at national level, would also enhance the employa-
bility of the discouraged worker who also tends to be among the more
marginalised groups in society.
In short, the European Commission’s twin objectives of competitive-
ness and employability may not be at odds with an increase in the regula-
tory framework governing employment relations and employment rights
across the EU. This chapter has two themes. First, to assess the extent to
which such claims are valid by looking at recent evidence from the UK
where there has been an increase in the volume and complexity of employ-
ment legislation on the statute book (DTI, 2000). This legislation covers a
variety of individual employment rights including working time, maternity
and parental leave, wage rates and discrimination. These rights are
enshrined in a number of pieces of legislation, including the Employment
Relations Act (1999), the Working Time Directive (1998) and National
Minimum Wage (1998).
Second, the discussion seeks to explore a range of issues in relation to the
development of labour regulation in the EU and the impact of this regula-
tion upon small firms. So, to what extent are owner-managers aware of the
new employment regulations? What, if any, are the different awareness
levels and effects within the small business population? What have been
their adjustments to it? How has it affected their business performance? The
rationale for this focus on the small firm sector is that employment legisla-
tion has excited a great deal of debate and comment from the media and
pressure groups with employers’ representatives expressing concern about
the effects on their enterprise (see The Daily Telegraph, 2000; Financial
Times, 2001). In theory, it has been argued that small firms are dispropor-
tionately affected by legislation and regulation because of the fixed costs of
compliance which are more difficult for them to absorb in terms of time and
resources afforded to these tasks (Better Regulation Task Force, 2000a).
EU social policy, employment relations and individual
employment rights
Flexibility and regulation – some aspects of the debate
The move towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has, according
to the Commission (CEC, 2000), helped create a more co-operative
employment relations climate as a result of shared macro-economic
objectives. The social partners have, albeit slowly, responded to the far-
reaching structural changes affecting industry, which has resulted in an
expansion of flexible forms of employment in European labour markets.
In the early 1990s, European labour markets were increasingly deregu-
lated, albeit from very different starting points. However, recent develop-
ments at European level towards the increased protection for atypical
workers (e.g. part-time workers) indicate the initial signs of the recon-
struction of labour market ‘institutions’. Such trends are treading a fine
line between the increased need for working time flexibility in many
sectors and firms and employee protection. This is clearly the case con-
cerning the labour market experience of women who, unlike men, are
more likely to experience flexible employment conditions throughout their
working lives (Rubery et al., 1999). The EU’s Part-time Workers’ Direc-
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tive in 1997 provides an indication of the attempt to ameliorate some of
the disadvantages confronting women in the labour market.
Arising out of the Social Charter, which was adopted by all the Member
States except the UK in 1989, the EU’s Social Affairs Council adopted the
Working Time Directive (WTD) in 1993 which was designed to limit
maximum hours of working (48 hours), and establish minimum entitle-
ments to rest periods and paid annual leave for most workers in the EU.
The objective and appeal of the policy was simple. The reduction of
working time would reduce unemployment without tinkering with Welfare
State regimes or affecting worker interests (Marimon and Zilibotti, 2000).
But can the WTD be an effective employment policy to translate the
volume of work into an increase in the number of individuals employed to
deliver that volume? Even if positive employment effects are found there
is always the difficulty of separating out the causal relationships from cycli-
cal trends. It should be noted that the debate on the efficacy of working
time reductions as an important tool in employment policy has its origins
in the late 1970s when countries such as Belgium, Germany, Denmark and
the Netherlands introduced a number of statutory or collectively agreed
reductions in working time (Bosch and Lehndorff, 2001).
There was a great deal of debate over the introduction of the WTD
within the EU with resistance coming particularly from the UK Govern-
ment, who were more inclined to present the counter-argument that com-
petitiveness would suffer as a result of higher employers’ unit labour costs
arising out of working time restrictions. According to orthodox economic
theory most individuals will be working at their utility level maximising
number of hours conditional on the wage they receive (Addison and
Seibert, 1979). Working time restriction has the effect of lowering
workers’ utility and hence employers’ unit labour costs rise. Another way
of looking at this is that when the working time of an individual worker is
cut, unit costs can be affected by the negotiated rise in wages to compen-
sate for the reduced hours worked (e.g. raising the hourly wage).
However, part of that negotiation may also involve effects on productivity
and changes in operating hours which, in turn, can have an effect on unit
costs (Bosch and Lehndorff, 2001). Further, there is an implicit assump-
tion in this theoretical position that the total amount of work to be done
remains constant. Finally, the way in which the total package is negotiated
between the employer and the employee will determine whether or not
the outcomes are cost neutral. For example, a reduction in the number of
working hours may be compensated by a wage increase but this in turn
may be offset by a lower annual pay rise.
A closer look at working time directives across the EU
The duration of working time has remained at the centre of discussions on
the employment relationship in the last two years across the EU. With the
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exception of the UK, the move towards the regulation of working time has
been covered by domestic industry specific or national collective agree-
ments. However, the move towards major cuts in the working week
through collective bargaining appears to have stalled in 2000 although they
are still on the agenda of many trade unions in Greece, Portugal and
Spain, or governments such as in Belgium (European Industrial Relations
Observatory (EIRO), 2001). France remains the stark exception within
the EU, where legislation introducing the 35-hour working week was
introduced in January 2000 for firms with more than 20 employees. In
January 2002, firms employing less than 20 employees were required to
reduce their working week to 35 hours.1 Within the EU this represents by
far the strongest policy initiative on WTD and is in no small way related to
a long-standing trade union goal within France.
Table 7.1 illustrates the statutory maximum working week across the
EU. In short, the countries can be divided into two groups. First, those
that have set their maximum weekly hours at 48 hours (as set out in the
EU WTD). France is included in this group but as noted above they have
set their statutory working week at 35 hours. For these countries this
maximum is well above the level of the average collectively agreed weekly
working hours and indeed of actual average weekly hours. What seems to
be happening here is that the 48 hours acts as some sort of a ‘safety net’
for workers. Second, those countries which operate a lower limit of 40
hours, which is much closer to the actual or agreed weekly hours, reflect a
much more effective legislative framework for ‘policing’ working time.
However, despite the impression of the universality of these legislative
changes, employees with ‘autonomous decision-making powers’ (i.e. man-
agers and executives), or those who work in excluded sectors (e.g. trans-
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port or hospital services), or where they have negotiated an agreement at
the level of the firm to restrict the application of the WTD, are exempt
from the directive. In short, large groups of workers are clearly not
covered by the directive and what is perhaps more worrying is that there
exists the ability for workers to ‘self-select’ themselves as possessing
‘autonomous decision-making powers’. The incentive to do this will reflect
the preferences of individual workers who are more likely to be motivated
by more earnings rather than fewer working hours (OECD, 1998). With
these opt-outs, the ability of the WTD to be an effective tool in an overall
employment policy is somewhat weakened. To reiterate, there is a three-
fold tension between the increase in flexible working practices, a need to
create jobs across the EU and the development of regulatory frameworks
designed to reduce the discriminatory processes in the labour market.
What has been the impact of working time reduction on
employment?
Although it is perhaps too soon to assess the employment effects of the
EU WTD, due to its very recent introduction into national legislative
frameworks, the earlier moves to reduce working hours in many European
countries do allow some attempt to reflect on the impact on employment.
Bosch and Lehndorff (2001) show that these early working time reduc-
tions have impacted upon the trends in working time. For example, in
Germany and Denmark the average weekly working time has fallen
markedly for full-time workers over the period 1983 to 1993: 1,808 to 1,739
hours and 1,833 to 1,747 hours, respectively. By contrast, data from the
European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO, 2001) indicates that in
the UK, annual hours for full-time employees have increased. But has the
absolute fall in annual working time hours resulted in increased employ-
ment? Bosch and Lehndorff review existing empirical studies which have
used a variety of techniques to isolate estimates of the employment effects
of reductions in working time. The difficulty, as noted above, is the ability
to separate out the effects of reduction in collectively agreed or statutory
working hours from broader effects of growth and productivity gains on
employment.
In summary, and notwithstanding the weaknesses associated with each
technique, Bosch and Lehndorff (2001:227) conclude that ‘most empirical
studies confirm that collective working time reductions can be expected to
have positive employment effects’. For example, in France the Ministry of
Labour, using data on the performance of companies introducing a reduc-
tion in working hours compared to those that had not, estimated that the
overall employment gain over the period 1996–99 preparatory period for
the legislation was around 100,000 jobs.
What emerged from many of these studies was the need to recognise
the importance in understanding the ‘employment gain’ which was not just
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a reduction in working hours per se, but also the actions taken by the
company, the social partners and the state in the period after the reduction
was implemented. In other words, to understand the conditions that are
necessary to ensure that working time reductions do actually lead to posit-
ive employment effects, which can best be summarised as follows:
• Agreement over the compensatory pay increases and productivity
gains (importance of incremental progress on the wage–time tension –
initial two-year agreements as in the case of France).
• Ensuring that the supply side of the labour market can respond to the
new opportunities.
• A sensitivity between working time, the total volume of work in the
company (operating hours) and the organisation of work.
• Ensuring job security in the growth of flexible working time systems.
• The role of the state in supporting a collective working time policy
through subsidised measures such as lower social security contribution
in the case of France.
One of the important debates concerning the WTD has been the differ-
ential effect that the legislation might have on the ability of small busi-
nesses to maintain their competitive position in the market place. For
example, the French Government decided not to go ahead in January 2002
and introduce the 35-hour working week for businesses employing less
than 20 employees in the face of some quite forceful lobbying on the
part of the small business sector. More generally, it is important to
assess the extent to which the raft of legislation within the generic frame-
work of ‘individual employment rights’ may have a greater impact on
small firms compared to larger firms. One might argue, a priori, that the
introduction of Individual Employment Rights (IERs) might have a dis-
proportionate effect upon micro-enterprises (less than 10 employees) and
small firms (between 10 and 49 employees) for a number of reasons. We
take a closer look at these reasons in the next section within the context of
a detailed assessment of the impact of the increased scale of IERs in the
UK since 1997.
Individual employment rights in the UK
When the Labour Government in the UK came to office in May 1997, one
of its first actions was to sign up to the European Social Chapter in an
acceptance of the existence of a social dimension to the process of Euro-
pean integration. However, rather than signalling a full acceptance of
European social policy the reality in the detail of the legislation has been
to accept the proposals and directives in a minimalist fashion, never
exceeding what was required by European legislation (McKay, 2001). The
following section probes in more detail the way in which the regulatory
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framework in the UK has undergone a relatively dramatic change since
1997 and seeks to assess the impact of this change on the small firm
sector.
The context: employment legislation and small firms
Employment legislation is amongst the most commonly applicable aspects
of regulation in the workplace. Over the past 10 years or so, employment
legislation has increased and since coming to power in 1997, the Labour
Government has added to the amount of legislation with the aim of pro-
viding more protection and rights for individuals in the workplace. This
new legislation is broadreaching and complex. Surprisingly, there has been
very little research undertaken on owner-managers’ awareness and know-
ledge levels of employment rights. Instead, the bulk of attention has
tended to look at the impact of employment legislation. The research that
does exist on awareness levels tends to focus on firms employing five or
more people (Callendar et al., 1999; Hogarth et al., 2001). However, the
volume of new employment legislation raises the question of the extent to
which smaller employers are aware of, and have detailed knowledge of,
these new rights. Government has attempted to communicate to employ-
ers through various media, but little is known about its success in reaching
owner-managers. Evidence suggests that owner-managers are generally
aware of the rise in legislation. Research conducted by MORI, commis-
sioned by the Small Business Service (SBS) on 1,500 firms with 0–249
employees, found that over two-fifths of SMEs considered that the amount
of Government regulations had increased since the election of the Labour
Government in 1997 (Small Business Service, 2001).
Whilst research on basic awareness and knowledge levels is scarce, that
on the impact of employment legislation is more readily available. A
number of small business membership bodies and lobby groups have been
vociferous in their criticism of new employment regulations. Studies have
shown the new employment legislation to be expensive for employers and
constrains the flexibility in their employment practices, ultimately affect-
ing their competitiveness (see British Chambers of Commerce, 1999; The
Daily Telegraph, 2000). Some surveys (e.g. Forum of Private Business,
2000; NatWest SBRT Quarterly Survey, 2000) have attempted to measure
the costs of compliance by asking employers to estimate the time taken to
deal with regulations. For example, a survey for the Small Business
Service survey reported that, of the regulations employers’ mentioned,
complying with Health and Safety legislation was considered to take the
most person hours, followed by the Working Time Directive (8 per cent)
and the National Minimum Wage (6 per cent) (Small Business Service,
2001:61–3). A survey of small business advisers has also provided esti-
mates of the financial costs of compliance with regulations amongst micro
and small firms and found that government regulation has become a more
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important factor in employers’ perceptions upon the constraints on busi-
ness performance (ICAEW, 2000).
In principle, the compliance costs of legislation are relatively higher in
small firms because of a poorer level of resources in comparison to larger
enterprises (Stanworth and Gray, 1991; Van de Horst et al., 2000). These
costs include learning the legislation, adjusting administrative procedures
to meet the new legislation, paying the relevant taxes or benefits and
absorbing the effects within the enterprise. In relation to employment leg-
islation it is likely that small firms are at a relative disadvantage because of
the absence of a personnel specialist and the greater proportionate contri-
bution of individual employees to output. Academic research which does
exist on the impact of recent employment legislation tends to present a
more limited effect than the more popular accounts, with this evidence
drawing attention to owner-managers’ ‘fire fighting’ management style
(Marlow and Strange, 2000). One of the main effects of the new legislation
has been a rise in the search for external advice by employers (Better Reg-
ulation Task Force, 2000b; Harris, 2000). However, compared with the
amount of legislation it can be argued that the volume of research is dis-
proportionately low.
A research focus on employment regulations and small firms is,
however, not new. Over 20 years ago, following the introduction of a
series of employment rights, employers’ representative groups voiced con-
cerns and research was commissioned by government. The results of the
research found that only two per cent of small employers cited employ-
ment legislation as the single main difficulty in running business. The
biggest perceived constraint was on being unable to sack unsatisfactory
workers; and that the expense and time involved in compliance were of
secondary importance (Clifton and Tatton-Brown, 1979:Ch.11; Employ-
ment Gazette, 1979; Westrip, 1982). The report concluded that the legisla-
tion may have involved expenses to employers and that, as a result, the
latter were being more careful about whom they employ.
In this section of the chapter we focus on three main areas of this legis-
lation (Table 7.2). The Working Time Directive is one of the major new
developments in employment legislation during the past decade. Intro-
duced in 1998, the legislation seeks to regulate employees amount of time
at work and provide certain break entitlements whilst at work. It has been
argued elsewhere that the WTD is a key element of employment rights’
legislation in terms of both its range and depth (IRS, 2000). Certainly the
WTD has received a number of criticisms because it has improved the
terms and conditions of workers at a cost to employers in addition to the
compliance costs of understanding and administering new regulations
(Forum of Private Business, 2000:22).
A further thrust of Government legislation has been on developing
‘family friendly’ employment regulations through the extension of mater-
nity leave and pay and parental leave. The rights to reinstatement after
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childbirth and protection from unfair dismissal on the grounds of preg-
nancy were introduced in June 1976 and maternity pay in April 1977.
Under the 1976 regulations, all pregnant women who met continuous
service requirements had the right to return to their previous jobs before
the end of 29 weeks after childbirth.2 These rights were reinforced under
the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act (1993) which intro-
duced the ‘Pregnant Workers’ Directive. Women who were expecting a
baby on, or after, October 1994 had the right to take 14 weeks off work,
regardless of their hours of work or length of service and those with 2
years service were entitled to 29 weeks leave. More recently, the rights for
maternity and parental leave have changed as a result of the Employment
Relations Act 1999 and the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations
1999. Initial reactions from employers’ groups to the new rights have been
critical and there have been suggestions that small firms should be exempt
from some of the provisions (British Chamber of Commerce, 1999).
However, there is no reason to assume that this emphasis will lose
momentum in the near future. There has, however, been an absence of
comprehensive and reliable evidence of employers’ knowledge levels of
the existing and new maternity and parental rights.3
A final area of study in this chapter is on the National Minimum Wage
(NMW). This has received a great deal of publicity and has been subject to
scrutiny by the Low Pay Commission of Inquiry which reports on the
impact on the NMW and makes recommendations on the rate to Govern-
ment (e.g. Low Pay Commission, 2000). Arguably, because of the relative
simplicity of the NMW and its high profile this may be one of the most
clearly understood areas of legislation. It is also the area where most
recently the bulk of research has been conducted (see for example, chapter
8). The overall aim of this section, therefore, is to provide: an analysis of
employers’ awareness of employment rights; to establish any differences in
small employers’ awareness of employment rights; and to analyse the
effects, real or perceived, of employment rights on their business.
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Table 7.2 Areas of recent legislation on employment rights in the UK
Working time (Working Time Directive, 1998)
Covers rights on maximum average hours (48) compelled to work; right to four
weeks paid leave (after 13 weeks); right to one day off per week; right to Statutory
Sick Pay; right to rest periods
Family friendly (Employment Relations Act, 1999)
Covers rights on: Maternity Leave; Additional Maternity Leave; Parental Leave;
Emergency Family Leave
National Minimum Wage (National Minimum Wage Act, 1998)
Sets minimum wage rates for workers in the UK.
Currently £4.10 per hour (from 1 October 2001); £3.50 per hour for workers aged
18–21 and workers aged 22 and above during their first six months in a new job
with a new employer and who are recently accredited training
It is likely that some areas of legislation may be better known to
employers than others because of the length of time on the statute books,
the amount of effort put into publicity campaigns and the perceived rele-
vance by employers to their enterprise. We also expect that knowledge
levels of specific rights would be very much influenced by ‘a need to know’
basis. Size of enterprise was expected to be a strong influence on aware-
ness and knowledge levels because of the increased likelihood of having to
understand the range of employment rights with a larger workforce and
the ability of employers to devote more time to a personnel specialism. It
was also expected that industry sector and the composition of the labour
force would be important determinants in awareness and knowledge
levels.
Methodology
The analysis in this chapter draws on a telephone survey of 1,071 small
business owners conducted in Autumn 2000 throughout Great Britain by
the Small Business Research Centre at Kingston University for the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). This was a survey stratified by
enterprise size, sector and location and then weighted back to reflect their
true proportions in the overall GB economy using the Inter Departmental
Business Register (IDBR). This ensured that a sufficient number of firms
having certain characteristics were interviewed. This was especially
important since one of the main weaknesses in other surveys is that they
often omit, or simply fail to attract, responses from owners of very small
firms. The mean size of firms in the sample was 7.2 employees (median six
employees), the minimum two employees and the maximum 49
employees. The response rate of the survey was 53.8 per cent, calculated
as the number of successful interviews (1,071) expressed as a percentage of
total valid firms contacted (i.e. including refusals and aborted interviews).
The results in the following analysis are based on the weighted sample and
therefore can be said to reflect the GB business population.
Interviewing business owners about employment legislation posed a
range of special problems. For example, who should we address our ques-
tions to when there was a division of labour between owners in the enter-
prise? How could we approach the key informant to discuss our research
questions and how detailed could our questioning of their awareness and
knowledge of rights go? Prior to the telephone interview, 18 face-to-face
interviews were conducted in order to help the researchers understand the
attitude of business owners and see how they responded to answering
questions and discussing employment rights. This helped shape the main
fieldwork instruments and design of the telephone questionnaire. In the
final questionnaire, on the core questions covering employment rights, we
started by asking employers’ awareness of a particular right such as mater-
nity leave, and only if they said that they were aware of such a right did we
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then ask detailed questions. This helped us focus on those rights which
employers were able to discuss as well as avoid alienating the employer.
This also helps raise the validity of the research when asking the perceived
impact of particular employment rights on their enterprise, something
which, we would argue, has been weak in other studies.
For businesses, individual employment rights constitute government
regulation. For small businesses, in particular, it is often argued that there
is a compliance burden which is regressive because of the economies of
scale required in meeting or administering the regulations. The Better
Regulation Task Force (2000a) for example, found that the absence of an
in-house expert on legislation did mean that legislation did have a dispro-
portionate effect on small firms. There are also suggestions that this legis-
lation is having the effect of deterring employers from recruiting and
expanding their workforce because of a regulatory burden. The last major
government research undertaken on this issue was carried out over 20
years ago following protests from employers’ groups over the adverse
impact of the employment legislation introduced in the 1970s (Clifton and
Tatton-Brown, 1979).
The next two sections present evidence on the owner-managers’ actual
awareness and knowledge of regulations, together with the perceived
impact of employment legislation on small firms’ business performance. A
number of questions are relevant here. For example, to what extent is
contemporary legislation promoting IERs inhibiting the performance of
small firms? What are the perceptions of business owners of the effect of
IERs on their businesses? To what extent are these based on actual
experiences or based on perceptions? How important a factor are IERs on
business performance in the context of other influences such as product
market conditions, availability of finance and so on? Which specific IERs
do employers perceive as having the greatest and least impact on their
business? What are the effects of these IERs?
Awareness and knowledge of IERs
Although there is a great deal of publicity surrounding the impact of regu-
lation on firms, there is relatively less understanding of owner-managers’
actual awareness and knowledge of regulations. Employment legislation
establishing the legal rights of workers is no exception. However, this is
important to investigate, particularly in a period of growing IERs. If
employers are relatively unaware of the IERs then this has implications
for how government communicates to SMEs. The awareness and know-
ledge levels of employers are also important to understand since they will
also help determine whether the reports of the effects of IERs are percep-
tion or experientially based.
Employers were presented with a sequence of questions to explore dif-
ferent levels of awareness and knowledge. The first question collected
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information on respondents’ self-assessed knowledge of employment
rights. This was followed by questions designed to test awareness of
particular rights. Those respondents who knew a particular right was
covered by legislation were then routed to a series of further questions, to
test their detailed knowledge of the provisions. In the sequence of ques-
tions on awareness and knowledge, three fictitious employment rights
were included. The rationale for this was to see if owner-managers were
merely claiming awareness to every right mentioned, which may be a
socially desirable response, or whether they were prepared to state no
awareness.
A number of major themes have emerged from this analysis of the
awareness and knowledge of IERs amongst respondents. First, generally,
owner-managers claimed to be aware of the major pieces of legislation in
relation to IERs (Table 7.3). Whilst this awareness was ‘claimed aware-
ness’ and in a telephone survey, every effort was made to ensure that
employers were able to reveal their understanding or ignorance on IERs.
Second, awareness varied according to particular IERs. Highest levels of
awareness were amongst both new (the NMW) and older pieces of legisla-
tion (maternity rights). However, lowest levels of awareness were amongst
new pieces of legislation, with the right for parental leave being the least
well known. Third, employers’ detailed knowledge was much lower than
their claimed awareness on all issues covered. This suggests that owner-
managers had some basic notion that legislation existed but they were not
able to provide many accurate responses on the details of legislation. It is
suggested that employers’ awareness and knowledge was raised when they
had to deal with a matter rather than any prior strategic knowledge acqui-
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Table 7.3 Summary of owner-managers awareness of IERs
Per cent aware that 
this is covered by 
legislation
Highest National Minimum Wage 98.7
Maternity Leave 95.6
Right to rest break 94.1
Right to paid holidays 91.1
Written statement of employment terms 89.7
Maximum number of hours worked 85.2
Application of employee rights to part-timers 83.7
Right to Maternity Pay 82.7
Right to a whole day off per week 68.4
Right for time-off to deal with emergencies 57.7
Minimum size of enterprise for disability rights 
to be applicable 50.1
Lowest Right to parental leave 48.8
Source: SBRC IER Survey (2000).
sition. These were small business owners and they dealt with information
on employment rights on a need-to-know basis.
Fourth, the size of enterprise proved to be the most consistent discrimi-
nator in picking out sub-sample variations when the sample was disaggre-
gated. It is argued that the major reason behind this relationship is that
employers in the larger small firms (rather than the micros) will encounter
a wider range of employment rights issues merely because they employ a
wider diversity of staff. It is also likely that the smaller enterprises were
less able to dedicate resources to keeping up-to-date with employment leg-
islation. Fifth, business sector and labour force composition (such as pro-
portion of females and part-time workers) proved influential on awareness
levels on specific issues. Being taken to an employment tribunal also
proved highly influential on knowledge levels: this not only raised detailed
knowledge about unfair dismissal and compensation levels but it also sen-
sitised employers to the wider range of IERs.
At the outset, it is expected that awareness and knowledge will vary
according to employers’ need to know. It is assumed that the particular
explanatory factors will include the size of enterprise, business sector,
employment composition and experiences during the running of the enter-
prise. However, the extent to which these factors are important remain
hitherto unexplained. In order to provide an overview of the awareness
and knowledge of IERs, a composite variable was created using the
employer’s responses to 21 questions asking them to indicate whether the
current legislation covered a list of possible employee rights. Table 7.4
indicates the number of questions asked under each area of the legislation.
A maximum score of 21 could have been obtained for correct answers
to all of the questions. Overall, a mean score of 16 was recorded for all the
small firms in the sample indicating a less than perfect awareness of all the
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Table 7.4 Owner-managers’ awareness of IERs covered by legislation: nature of
the composite variable 
Area of the legislation Number of questions included
Maternity provisions (Q14a–Q14c) 3
Time off for dependents (Q14d) 1
Terms and conditions of employment (Q14e–Q14f) 2
WTD (hours per week) (Q14g) 1




Unfair dismissal (Q14p–Q14r) 3
Total 21
Source: SBRC IER Survey (2000).
areas of the legislation. How does this score vary across sub-groups within
the sample? In order to understand the complexities of awareness and
knowledge across the diversity of the small businesses in the sample, a
multi-variate approach was adopted for the analysis of the composite vari-
able. An OLS regression was undertaken with the dependent variable
specified as the composite awareness variable with a possible score in the
range 0–21. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 7.5.
In this model, what could be classified as three types of variable are
included: contextual (Size of firm, Age of firm, Sector, Location); internal
firm characteristics and experience (Sex of employer/respondent, Work-
force composition I and II, Ethnic minorities in the workforce, Major
occupational grouping, Businesses taken to an employment tribunal); and
perception of the Impact of employment legislation (impact of IERs). The
last may in fact have two-way causality, but this is included because it is
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Table 7.5 Equation for composite awareness of individual employment rights
Variable Coefficients t statistic
Constant 14.785 38.985
Size of firm 0.544 3.861
(log of employment)
Age of firm 0.207 3.007
(logged)
Sector 0.495  2.584
(1 Primary, manufacturing and construction; 
0Services)
Location 0.364 2.169
(1 South East; 0 Rest of GB)
Sex of employer/respondent 0.598  3.429
(1 Male; 0 Female)
Workforce composition I 1.362.102 4.230
(% Part-time workers)
Workforce composition II 1.006.102  2.943
(% Female workers)
Ethnic minorities in the workforce 0.407 1.707
(1 Yes; 0No)
Major occupational grouping 0.431  2.033
(1 Operatives; 0 All others groups)
Business taken to an employment tribunal  0.425  1.478
(1 Yes; 0No)
Impact of employment legislation  0.673  4.082






Source: SBRC IER Survey (2000).
significant. The R2 is low but the equation is statistically significant and all
but one variable (employment tribunal) is significant.
The interpretation of the results of the model suggests that there is a
clear relationship between firm characteristics and awareness of IERs with
size, age and sector being significant. In detail, the larger the enterprise the
more knowledgeable employers are of the legislation, while greater know-
ledge is associated with younger businesses. If enterprises are in the
primary, manufacturing or construction sectors (i.e. not in services), then
the employers are more knowledgeable of the legislation. Connected to
this, if operatives are the main occupational group in the business, the
employers are more knowledgeable of the legislation. Knowledge levels
increase outside the South East suggesting that in ‘tight’ labour markets
employer knowledge is weak, perhaps due to the confidence that recruit-
ment of workers is a relatively easy process.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the ‘family friendly’ nature of much of the
IER legislation, male employers are more knowledgeable of the legislation
than female employers. The explanation for this does not appear to lie
with the composition of the workforce in the respondent’s firm as these
variables are also held constant in the equation. For example, the fewer
the percentage of part-timers in the workforce and the higher the propor-
tion of females, the more knowledgeable employers are of the legislation,
irrespective of their gender. Employing ethnic minorities does not raise
knowledge levels. As noted in other studies (Marlow, 2002), the
experience of an Employment Tribunal does raise employers’ knowledge
levels and induces greater compliance, but although this contributes to
the model, the individual relationship is not statistically significant.
Finally, those respondents who stated that the legislation is a significant
burden on the performance of their business are more knowledgeable of
the legislation.
The overall conclusion to be drawn from this multivariate analysis is
that knowledge levels of IERs are complex and vary greatly within the
small business sector. The range of variables which may ‘explain’ aware-
ness of the legislation, as measured by 21 factual questions on all aspects
of the legislation, provides an important indication of those segments of
the small business sector which require further intervention by govern-
ment in terms of increasing their knowledge levels about IERs. Although
the model provides some explanation of the variation in knowledge levels
of IERs in the sample, the low R2 suggests that other factors (i.e. missing
variables) not included in the model are also influential.
Impact of employment legislation on business performance
Some of the most high profile studies of employment legislation have been
on its constraining effects on businesses. Business owners in the survey
revealed that despite a rise in legislation, ‘competition’ and labour markets
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were considered to be the greatest constraint on business performance
over the past two years (Table 7.6). However, government legislation or
regulation was mentioned by a third of all respondents as a constraint and
these were cited as the second most important constraint of all the factors
mentioned. Of course, this can include anything ranging, for example,
from taxation to environmental laws. An examination of the responses
found ‘Employment laws’ to be the most commonly cited followed by
‘Health and Safety requirements’.
In the Department of Employment survey conducted 20 years ago
(Clifton and Tatton-Brown, 1979) employment legislation was mentioned
by only 2 per cent of respondents as the single most important difficulty in
running the business over the past year. Even allowing for any methodo-
logical variations between the two surveys, it would be fair to deduce that
employers are now more conscious of employment regulations than 20
years ago as ‘regulatory capture’ becomes more widespread. This ‘effect’
clearly needs further investigation but we would argue that this is a result
of the legislation introduced over this 20-year period and particularly since
1997. However, it should be reported in this context that a formal econo-
metric test (logistic regression) of the impact of awareness of IERs on
business performance, while holding the other variables reported in Table
7.7 constant, showed no influence on whether a firm reported growth in
turnover in the three years prior to the survey (i.e. 1998 to 2001).
Those business owners who stated that employment rights had signific-
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Table 7.6 Constraints on business performance over last two years
Per cent/Weighted
Any Main N (Unweighted N)
mentiona factor
Competition 50.2 33.0 538 (524)
Labour markets 33.9 11.1 363 (465)
Government legislation or 
regulations 33.3 17.0 357 (418)
Cash flow/bad debt 31.3 10.7 336 (319)
Premises/rent/rates 31.0 12.3 332 (318)
Interest rates/cost of finance 21.2 3.3 227 (187)
High value sterling 15.5 3.2 166 (194)
Access to finance 9.6 1.8 103 (95)
Others 5.4 4.2 58 (60)
Don’t know/no main constraint – 3.4 32 (3.2)
Total – 100.0 961 (977)
N 961 (977)
Source: SBRC IER Survey (2000).
Note
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































antly affected their business (i.e. a third of the sample) were asked about
their impact. The biggest single effect was on ‘administrative workload’
followed by the ‘amount of legal advice’ (Table 7.7). There were also
important employment and management effects. Adjustments in the
numbers employed, or recruited in the past two years, the ways in which
employees are managed and changes in employment contracts were all
viewed as important changes in business operations by employers as a
result of employment rights. It is also apparent that the effects of employ-
ment rights on the amount of administration workload and legal advice
seeking are higher in the larger firms (Table 7.7) This size effect may be a
result of the fact that these firms employ significant numbers of staff and
thus their owners are more likely to have to come to terms with effects of
employment rights. However, the smaller firms appear more likely to
report an impact on the numbers employed and the balance between full
and part-time employees. It may be that the perception of employment
rights as a constraint on enterprise is deterring some of these micro firms
from taking on staff.
This emphasis on a rise in the administrative workload as a result of
employment rights should not be surprising. Other surveys have shown
this to be the most immediate effect. Similarly, a rise in the amount of
legal advice confirms the results of other studies (e.g. Better Regulation
Task Force, 2000b: 7–8; Harris, 2000). Few employers report a shift in the
balance between male and female employees or a rise in the use of agency
or self-employed workers. In other words, they are not making strategic
shifts in their labour force composition as consciously, or immediately, as
some commentators have suggested. One possible explanation for the
emphasis on the rise in administration is that in many cases it is the
employer who actually deals with these matters and the immediate impact
of IERs may be to actually increase their workload. Given that most
employers are antithetical to bureaucracy (see Scase and Goffee, 1987) it
is not surprising that this effect is recorded as the highest.4
It was anticipated that there would be some variation in the effects of
different employment rights in the sample (Table 7.8) with the greatest
impact coming from the National Minimum Wage (NMW) (8.2 per cent of
the whole sample), followed by basic terms and conditions of employment
(7.4 per cent) and then maternity rights (6.4 per cent). However, the
numbers of employers experiencing negative effects are low overall, and
with a strong positive relationship between firm size and perceived impact.
On a firm size analysis, it appears that the highest negative scores were in
the 20–49 size band and especially in relation to maternity rights, NMW
and unfair dismissal.5
In this research, strong sector difference and labour force composition
effects were expected although, hitherto, there has been little research
exploring such aspects. The data confirmed our expectations of an uneven
impact as shown in Table 7.8, where the number of negative responses by






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































employers are classified by business sector. Employers in Distribution
were especially negative about the effects of employment rights (Table
7.8). With those in Hotels and catering most negative about the extension
of rights to part-timers reflecting their high dependence upon part-time
labour, and minimum work breaks. Employers in Business and profes-
sional services recorded the highest number of employers expressing nega-
tivity about maternity rights. Although the precise reasons for these
patterns in the data can only be covered through further qualitative
research, these findings do take us away from making blanket statements
regarding the effects of employment rights in small firms.
In order to explore the uneven effects of employment rights further, an
analysis of employment rights according to the proportion of females in
the labour force is shown in (Table 7.9). Employers with at least 75 per
cent of their labour force being female were most likely to record mater-
nity rights and the extension of rights to part-timers as having a perceived
negative effect on business performance (Table 7.9). However, employers
with no female workers were more likely to record perceived negative
effects resulting from basic terms and conditions, limits on the working
week and rights to regular time off work: that is IERs with no specific
gender target. Again this analysis illuminates the varying effects of
employment rights according to enterprise characteristics.
Conclusions
As the volume and complexity of legislation relating to business expands,
employers’ representative bodies in the UK have complained increasingly
that this creates operational problems, particularly for small firms. In our
investigation of the awareness and impact of Individual Employment
Rights in the UK a major theme to emerge was the relative buoyancy of
the enterprises in terms of turnover and employment. A self-assessment of
the constraints on business performance over the past two years revealed
competition in markets to be the overwhelming factor. This confirms find-
ings of earlier studies (Clifton and Tatton-Brown, 1979; Scott et al., 1989).
In other words, employment legislation was not the overriding factor in
business performance. However, there was evidence to suggest that
employment legislation was rising in importance as a constraint amongst
small firms in the UK. Compared with earlier surveys (e.g. Clifton and
Tatton-Brown, 1979; Scott et al., 1989) mention of employment legislation
has risen in rank order. Employers were particularly affected by the rise in
administration which IERs legislation had created for them.
Few employers provided evidence of a strategic response to the effects
of individual employment rights on their enterprise. For example, employ-
ers were unlikely to report switches in the composition of their labour
force as a result of the introduction of rights for part-timers. Thus, the
argument that such rights may create prejudices against certain types of



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































employees, by for example strategic changes in recruitment patterns, were
not founded in the sample. Whether or not these fears are totally
unfounded, or will take time to emerge, remains to be seen.
Our evidence found that whilst the impact of IERs on the sample was
not broad, in the sense of affecting many businesses, they may be affecting
specific types of enterprise at risk in terms of their size, sector and employ-
ment composition. Smaller firms in the sample were less likely to report
negative effects, which fits in with the earlier findings that they were also
less aware of the details of employment legislation. Moreover, the survey
revealed that different types of IER were affecting different types of
enterprise. For example, maternity rights were more likely to affect
employers with a high proportion of females and it was these employers
who were most likely to record negative effects regarding maternity rights.
The results also reveal a curious, though not illogical, pattern on assess-
ing the effects of IERs. Although the bulk of employers tended to be
vague in their knowledge of employment rights, they were prepared to be
critical of the effects of this legislation on their enterprise. This suggests
that the results of surveys of this kind are influenced by a negative predis-
position on the effects of government intervention. Clearly, this predispo-
sition and subsequent perception needs addressing. For example, it could
be that these perceptions are rooted in the self-definitions of owner-
managers. Many owner-managers are resistant to external guidance or
advice, let alone legislation, and even without knowing the detailed effects
many start with a negative disposition. It may also be that perceptions of
the effects of IERs on enterprise are also bound up with other government
interventions such as taxation. A small number of employers were,
however, supportive of the new employment rights recognising that legis-
lation provided guidelines and clarification for them whilst increasing staff
morale and security. However, the finding that almost two-thirds of
employers did not record a benefit of the effect of IERs on their business
does suggest that, overall, there is a very negative outlook such that when
employers are ‘captured’ by legislation, they are more likely to be critical
of it.
Methodologically the study poses some questions for other surveys of
regulation and the small firm. From the results it appears that the greater
the knowledge and experience employers have of employment rights, the
more likely they are able to make informed assessments of the effects on
their enterprise and that these assessments are more likely to be negative.
Whilst we would not go so far as to argue that for the less informed
employer, ‘ignorance is bliss’, it appears to be this group who record
fewest negative effects. Undoubtedly, this is closely linked to their man-
agement style (Marlow and Strange, 2000). However, given the low levels
of awareness recorded by employers on some aspects of recent employ-
ment legislation, the sweeping statements regarding the negative effects of
employment legislation on small firms, as reported in some surveys, are
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open to question. Instead, it is argued that these responses are often
rooted in the negative predisposition employers have on regulation and
the constituency of the surveys rather than on direct experiences.
In short, the above analysis from the UK would tend to suggest that the
increase in the intensity of the individual employment rights legislation in
recent years may not be having the detrimental effect upon business
performance as suggested. Further, there is no evidence to indicate that
the employability of the more atypical worker, namely the female part-
time ‘flexible’ worker, has been adversely affected. Consequently, one
implication to be drawn from these results is that the development of a set
of minimum standards in the EU labour market, which seek to safeguard
many of the social aspects of the employment contract, does not appear to
be an obstacle to the growth of individual SMEs.
However, neither was there any evidence to suggest that such a
commitment to minimum standards has delivered greater productivity
with very few owner-managers reporting any positive effects of IERs on
their business. From this evidence it can be argued that at best the impact
of the IER legislation has been neutral for SMEs in general. As a result
EU-driven policies designed to eliminate discriminatory wage practices
and safeguard traditionally low-paid groups can be introduced into the
regulatory framework for the labour market in order to address the twin
objectives of economic and social cohesion within the EU without damag-
ing competitiveness and growth. In short, the European Commission’s
twin objectives of competitiveness and employability may not be at odds
with an increase in the regulatory framework governing employment rela-
tions and employment rights across the EU.
However, more recent comparative evidence from the Lloyds
TSB/SBRC (2001) European Survey of SMEs carried out in 2002 would
suggest that this conclusion is perhaps too optimistic. The first point to
note is that owner-managers of SMEs in the UK, France and Germany
regard the balance of IER legislation to be in favour of the employee
(Lloyds TSB/SBRC, 2003). Probing further on the impact of this legisla-
tion on the recruitment process, this sample of owner-managers viewed
the impact of IER legislation as a burden with the French and Germans
more inclined to report this view. Almost three-quarters of French and
one-half of German owner-managers view the impact of the IER legisla-
tion as a constraint to employing new staff compared with two-fifths of UK
owner-managers. Indeed, SMEs in France were significantly less likely to
employ part-time workers than SMEs in Germany and the UK, which may
reflect a very pragmatic solution on the part of French owner-managers to
ensure that they do not fall within the ‘footprint’ of certain parts of the
legislation.
While in France and Germany there was no significant difference in the
results by size of firm, in the UK it was the owner-managers of larger
SMEs (employing 50 or more workers) who were more likely to report
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that the IER legislation was a constraint on their ability to recruit workers.
This reinforced the point made earlier from the DTI study and suggests
that very small firms do not report effects (either negative or positive)
because they are not aware of many aspects of the legislation. Overall,
therefore, there are clear differences between the three EU Member
States in this study which reflect the pace, and more importantly the
intensity, of the adoption of EU directives concerning the regulation of the
labour market. What emerges is that the regulatory framework for the
labour market in the UK is perceived as being relatively more benign for
SMEs than in France and Germany.
This then leads on to a final question which concerns the type of regula-
tory model for the labour market that is appropriate to achieve the object-
ives of competitiveness and employability within the EU, whilst adhering
to the principles of economic and social cohesion. From the evidence pre-
sented above it is possible to conclude that the model currently in place in
the UK may be working relatively more efficiently than those observed in
France and Germany. The implementation of the 35-hour working week
in France and the long-established family-friendly work environment in
Germany, appear to be creating difficulties for the small business sector.
The temptation, therefore, in both France and Germany is to seek to relax
many aspects of the current labour market legislation and to move
towards adopting the ‘UK model’. However, there is, of course, a macro-
economic context to these cross-country comparisons with Germany and
France at different stages of the economic cycle than the UK. The guiding
principle at the core of EU social policy, which operates on the assump-
tion that the labour market is as much a social construction as an eco-
nomic one, must not, therefore, be sacrificed under the pressure of
political expediency in the two major economies of the EU 15 as they seek
to resolve their respective economic crises.
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Notes
1 In July 2001 it was reported that only one small firm in 30 in the Provence Alpes
Cotes d’Azur (PACA) region in France had introduced a 35-hour working
week.
2 Only women with 2 years service and working for at least 16 hours a week (or 
5 years if working less than 16 hours) qualified.
3 Hogarth et al. (2001) reported that only a modest proportion of employers
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where aware of the changes in maternity leave and parental leave regulations
introduced in 1999. However, this survey was in workplaces employing five or
more employees. Callender et al. (1999) provide a more detailed, though now
dated, analysis. The DTI Employers’ Survey on Support for Working Parents,
recently conducted for the Work and Parents Review, provides more up-to-date
material although is unfortunately restricted to firms with five or more
employees.
4 Although the overwhelming bulk of research has reported negative views by
employers on the effects of employment rights on their business performance, a
minority in our survey perceived some positive effects. One in five employers
stated that legislation provided them with guidelines and clarification in setting
the conditions for their workers. Almost 10 per cent of employers stated that
IERs raised staff morale and engendered a feeling of security.
5 The positive relationship between the size of firm and negative effects is con-
firmed elsewhere (Small Business Service, 2001:63–5). These results will be pre-
sented elsewhere but in this paper we wish to focus on differences between firms
in different sectors.
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